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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
In spite of frequent statements to the contrary, 9 the doctrine of re-
coupment in federal taxation still lives, as evidenced by the many
recent cases which employ it to effect an equitable result seemingly
otherwise unobtainable because of the specific language of the statutes
barring the claim. The taxes must arise out of the same transaction
and the parties in interest must be the same. The longer the period of
time which the transaction covers, the more doubtful is the application
of the doctrine by the courts. If fresh claims could be created by act
of one of the parties in favor of the other to enable the creator to recoup
barred claims, the whole policy of barring claims would be defeated and
no equities demand the application of the remedy.40 Like most other
problems in law, questions such as "What constitutes a single taxable
event or the same transaction ?" and "How long is too long ?" may never
be finally answered but can only be circumscribed by recurring decisions.
JOEL L. FLEISHMAN
Tort Claims Act-Distinction between Nonfeasance and Misfeasance
In Flynn v. State Highway Commn,1 plaintiff's intestate was killed
when the truck in which he was a passenger was wrecked as a result
of its wheel striking a hole in the road, causing its driver to lose con-
trol. In plaintiff's action against the state for negligence in leaving the
road in disrepair, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, which
had affirmed the Industrial Commission, holding that the Tort Claims
Act covers only negligent acts by state employees and not negligent
omissions. In reaching this decision the court stated:
In order to authorize the payment of compensation, the Industrial
Commission's finding must include (1) a negligent act, (2) on
the part of a state employee, (3) while acting in the scope of his
employment, etc. The first requirement is that the claimant
show a negligent act. Is a failure to repair a hole in the high-
way caused by ordinary public travel a negligent act? The re-
quirement of the statute is not met by showing negligence, for
negligence may consist of an act or an omission. Failure to act
is not an act. We think it was the intent of the legislature to
permit recovery only for the negligent acts of its employees, for
the things done by them, not for the things left undone. If the
intent had been otherwise, it would have been easy to permit
recovery for the negligent acts and omissions of State employees.2
" Wood v. United States, 213 F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1954).
"
0 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Finnegan, 53-1 CCH U.S. TAx CAS. 119299(E.D. Mo. 1953).
1244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956).21d. at 620, 94 S.E.2d at 572.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The provision of the Tort Claims Act that recovery may be had
only for a negligent act3 considerably limits the state's tort liability.
Negligence is usually defined as the failure to use due care, or to act as
a reasonably prudent man would act under the same or similar circum-
stances. 4  It is generally recognized that negligence may consist of
either a negligent act or a negligent omission to act.5 Indeed, the court
in the principal case recognized as much in the language quoted above.
The distinction between acts and omissions seems not to have pene-
trated the field of municipal liability for torts committed by its agents
either in North Carolina or other states. There is accord among the
courts as to the rule of liability of municipal corporations.6 A munici-
pality is generally held liable for failure to maintain its streets, even
though maintenance of streets is a governmental and not a proprietary
function; liability does not usually attach to negligent performance by a
municipality of a governmental function.7 By statute8 in North Carolina
there is imposed on municipalities the positive duty to maintain streets in
a reasonably safe condition for travel, and negligent failure to do so will
result in liability for proximate injury.9 Many of the cases arising
against municipalities have concerned negligent omissions10 rather than
negligent acts. If these'actions had been brought under the Tort Claims
Act there seems no reason to doubt that the plaintiff would have had
no chance of recovery.
It is very hard to find fault with the decision in the Flynn case.
The court has in the past committed itself to a strict construction of
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1952).
' Barnes v. Caulbourne, 240 N.C. 721, 83 S.E.2d 89.8 (1954); Rea v. Simowitz,
225 N.C. 575, 35 S.E.2d 871 (1945); PROSSER, TORTS § 31 (2d ed. 1955).
' "If the defendant enters upon an affirmative course of conduct affecting the
interest of another, he is regarded as assuming a duty to act, and, will therefore
be liable for negligent acts or omissions." (Emphasis added.) PROSSER, TORTS§ 38c (2d ed. 1955). Mikeal v. Pendleton, 237 N.C. 690, 75 S.E.2d 756 (1953) ;
Diamond v. McDonald Service Stores, 211 N.C. 632, 191 S.E. 358 (1937); Ham-
ilton v. Southern Ry., 200 N.C. 543, 158 S.E. 75 (1931).
' "Apart from statute late decisions in a majority of the states affirm implied
municipal liability to private actions for injuries resulting from defective public
ways. In other words, the right to recover, against a city for actionable negligence
for defects in its streets and sidewalks is based on the common law, and requires
no statute to proclaim it." 7 McQuiLLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2901 (rev.
ed. 1945).
"Glenn v. Raleigh, 246 N.C. 469, 479, 98 S.E2d 913, 920 (1957) (concurring
opinion); Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 97 (1957).8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-54 (1952).
'Hunt v. High Point, 226 N.C. 74, 36 S.E.2d 694 (1946); Millar v. Wilson,
222 N.C. 340, 23 S.E.2d 42 (1942) ; Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N.C. 431 (1884).
" Hunt v. High Point, 226 N.C. 74, 36 S.E.2d 694 (1946) (failure to provide
handrail and to furnish adequate lighting) ; Beaver v. China Grove, 222 N.C. 234,
22 S.E.2d 434 (1942) (failure to erect caution signs; manhole cover allowed to
protrude) ; Waters v. Belhaven, 222 N.C. 20, 21 S.E.2d 840 (1942) (wire hoops
not removed from street) ; Love v. Asheville, 210 N.C. 476, 187 S.E. 562 (1936)(failure to clear ice from bridge).
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the act." Our court is not alone in this view, 12 the reason being that a
statute creating sovereign liability is in derogation of the common law
and grants a right not naturally accorded the citizens of a state.18
Argument cannot validly be based on the proposition that the legis-
lature intended the act to include negligent omissions as well as neg-
ligent acts. As is pointed out in the Flynn case, the legislature
amended the Tort Claims Act in March 1955 by inserting the words
"or omission" after the words "negligent act."'14 This amendment may
indicate that the legislature did not consider them as part of the original
act. In May 1955 the act was again amended to strike out the words
"or omission" from the amended version. 15  These two amendments
indicate the unmistakable intent of the legislature to exclude state
liability for negligent omissions, so that the court's interpretation of
legislative intent is unimpeachable.
Many fears account for continuation of the principle of govern-
mental immunity. Perhaps the chief one is the fear that the public coffers
cannot stand the strain which would be thrust upon them by the insti-
tution of many suits demanding damages for torts. Time has shown
that this fear is not valid. In allowing recovery for torts all states have
found that this expense constitutes but a very minute part of total
annual expenditures. 16 This fear coupled with reluctance to depart
from a well worn path are, perhaps, why the legislature let caution
be its watchword. There is an obvious inequality in allowing the plain-
tiff injured by a negligent act to recover, while denying recovery to
the plaintiff injured as a result of an equally negligent omission to act.
It is submitted that the act should be amended so as to make the state
liable for the negligence of its employees "in accordance with the same
rules of law'as applied to action . . . against individuals and corpora-
tions.'" The adoption of this amendment would bring North Carolina
in line with the New York and federal view of governmental liability,
which is that the government is liable the same as private parties.'8
JESsE M. HENLEY, JR.
11Jenkins v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 94 S.E.2d 577(1956), 35 N.C.L. REv. 564 (1957); Floyd v. State Highway Comm'n, 244 N.C.
461, 85 S.E.2d 703 (1955).12 Borchard, Government Liabiilty in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924).
IS Borchard, supra note 12, at 9.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 400.
"N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 1361.
1" Anderson, Recovery from the United States Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 31 MINN. L. REv. 465 (1947).1 1N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8.
1860 STAT. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2674 (1952) ; N.Y. Cr. CL. ACT § 8.
There has been little or no symmetry in the adoption by the states of tort
claims acts. Indeed there are few states that have a unified act or group of
statutes which might be termed a tort claims act. Many states have constitutional
provisions which prohibit the state from being made a defendant in a tort action.
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